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Introduction
Full spectrum dominance depends on the inherent strengths of modern space
power-speed, global range, stealth, flexibility, precision, lethality, global theater
situational awareness and strategic perspective.
-Air Force White Paper, Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air
Force[1]
Arguably, one of the most significant global security policy debates of the 21st
century is whether the United States and more specifically the Bush
Administration should develop and deploy space-based weaponry. The age of
space is upon us. But how convinced is the rest of America, the West and
potential adversaries of the legitimate need to do so? For almost half a century,
the world's space powers have abstained from deploying such weapons as basic
unwritten policy. To date, the military has been limited to surveillance, navigation
and communications satellites. In June 2001, Former Air Force Chief of Staff,
General Michael Ryan was quoted as saying, "Eventually we're going to have to
have the capability to take things out in orbit."[2]

His argument is based on the premise that historically,
wherever commerce has gone so does US national
interest and, subsequently, the requirement to protect
that interest. This rationale for the deployment of
offensive space weaponry should elicit much debate, especially as our military is
reduced in size. Policymakers and institutions of higher learning need to address
this issue before the "Final Frontier" becomes a battlefield. To neglect the topic
and let the militarization of space happen out of apathy will be to relinquish any
input over a decision, which could potentially destroy the planet.
The technological revolution of the late twentieth century has provided the US
military an incredible conventional offensive force and altered forever the way
war can and will be waged. In March 2002, Paul Teets, Undersecretary of the Air
Force and Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, as well as the
Pentagon's lead procurement officer for space programs, stated, "I believe that
weapons will go into space. It's a question of time. And we need to be at the
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forefront of that."[3] Teets has a significant baseline to work from to effectuate
this concept. The advent of precision- guided munitions has provided war
fighters, for example, with ordnance accuracies measured as Circular Errors of
Probability (CEPs) on the order of a few feet.

Newer weapons including laser guided bombs, Global
Positioning System (GPS) guided munitions, and
Tomahawk missiles have given military forces an
immense capability that will assist in the defeat of any known enemy and, if used
correctly, with minimum collateral damage and civilian casualties. Yet, this
certainly is just the beginning of the revolution. The trend will be toward even
more precise and lethal weapons systems, often unmanned or minimally manned,
and able to respond within seconds to attack targets anywhere on earth. On this
basis, space seems to offer significant advantages in future warfare, and,
currently, the US government is actively pursuing research on spaced based laser
and kinetic weapons.
This paper will seek to provide some perspective on the necessity of such pursuits
and the possible consequences of rushing in without thinking. The discussion will
describe the types of offensive space-based weapons most likely to be developed
and deployed in the early 21st Century as well as the potential impact on US
military force structure, roles and missions, and doctrine. Clearly, the military has
accepted that conflict in space is now inevitable and is preparing for it. The
stabilizing or destabilizing impact on the world security environment, from an
academic perspective, will also be addressed.
Historical Developments
Arguably, the militarization of space commenced with the launch of the Soviet
Union's Sputnik satellite in 1957. In the early stages of the Cold War, both sides
began competing in space to conquer and use space for the benefit of military
forces. President Dwight Eisenhower's response to Sputnik was rather muted
especially in relation to the public outcry over the event.

He personally believed that the public's concern was
unwarranted; failing thus to act quickly to equal the
Soviet Union's effort, he ensured America's second place
position in space for the near term.[4] More recently, the
Clinton Administration's philosophy of a restrained
approach has been replaced with the Bush
Administration's unquestioning acceptance of
exploitation of space for military purposes.
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The separation of military and civilian space programs became codified in July
1958 with the passage of the National Aeronautics and Space Act, which formally
created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The US
effort was focused toward peaceful scientific and commercial applications. Later,
when President John F. Kennedy decided to engage in the race to place a man on
the moon, the effort assumed a priority position and the military quickly
recognized they were losing potential funding.
Military efforts in space did exist and were supported and characterized as
"peaceful" missions. The advent of reconnaissance satellites brought one of those
peaceful missions to the forefront following the downing of a U-2 spy plane over
the Soviet Union in May 1960. Officially, US space policy evolved from the
advocacy of the non-military use of space to one of non-aggressive use of
space.[5]
In order to legally continue the programs, the US began to seek confirming
international agreements. The idea was not new and incorporated Eisenhower's
"Open Skies" initiative. The former Soviet Union rejected the entire concept to
allow free over flights of each other's country to verify the location and numbers
of nuclear weapons.[6]
Even though the major powers were not in agreement, they continued to
experiment but not deploy. Gradually both the Soviet Union and the US expanded
military space programs but still restrained themselves from actively using
technology capable of shooting down satellites from the ground, sea or air.
Nonetheless, trepidation about Soviet threats to place nuclear weapons in orbit led
Eisenhower to propose a ban on nuclear weapons in space as early as September
1960. The Soviets agreed, which led to a bilateral agreement to ban nuclear
weapons testing from outer space. Specifically, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty
prohibits the placing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space or on celestial
bodies; including the moon.
Additionally, the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
systems banned either side form interfering with the other's spy satellites. Both of
these important documents continue to have considerable influence on the current
debate because both the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the ABM Treaty served to
reinforce the self-restraint on the deployment of military space weaponry that
Eisenhower advanced. The end of the first Cold War precipitated a reevaluation
of current policy.
In the 1990's, National Security Council (NSC) Directive 5520, dated 26 May
1995, recommended separating the US space effort from ongoing military
programs to develop Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). This directive
worked to disengage the military from satellite development programs and
diverted monies to ICBM programs. Six years later in April 2001, prior to 9/11,
the Transformation Study Report, drafted for the Office of the Secretary of
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Defense reasoned that, " Space capabilities are inherently global, unaffected by
territorial boundaries or jurisdictional limitations; they provide direct access to all
regions, and with our advanced technologies, give us a highly asymmetrical
advantage over any potential adversary.[7]
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) made clear that a key objective for
the military in the 21st Century is not only to exploit space for military purposes
but to make sure that the US maintains full spectrum dominance in space. Right
after 9/11, Defense Secretary Donald A. Rumsfeld created a Policy coordinating
committee for Space within the National Security Council, recognizing that the
US is extremely dependent on space and arguably the dependency on
communication and navigation networks needed to be protected. The
Administration continues to formulate and implement its offensive spaced basebased weapons initiatives without much scrutiny.
Treaties and the Law of Space
Emotions run high throughout diplomatic and political circles when the space
treaties mentioned-above are debated. As is frequently the case, the difficulties
arise in how world governments interpret the terminology contained in them. The
exact wording of Article IV (1) of the 1967 Outer Space (hereinafter referred to as
the 1967 Treaty), is:
States party to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass
destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in
outer space in any manner.[8]
The article goes on to state that; "the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used
by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes."
Unfortunately, the inadequacy of the wording has caused heated debate in
military, political, and scientific communities. "Peaceful purposes" apparently
only applies to the "moon and other celestial bodies," not to earth orbit or "outer
space" as used in the treaty. The placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit
is clearly prohibited; yet, the definition of a weapon of mass destruction is not as
specifically defined. It is assumed any nuclear, chemical or biological would meet
the criteria.
The 1972 ABM Treaty is also susceptible to varying interpretations depending on
perspective. The debate began in 1983 after President Reagan's decision to start
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research and development. Article V (1) in the
ABM Treaty states:
Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or
components, which are sea-based, air-based, or mobile land-based.[9]
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Although deployment of a space-based missile defense system is in clear violation
of Article V, Reagan hoped that by offering to share technology with the former
Soviet Union, he could obtain an agreement to mutually nullify the treaty.
Additionally, the ABM Treaty does not prevent research and development efforts
as long as components are not tested. [10] How to exactly define "testing" is open
to elucidation. On top of that, subcomponents can legally be tested compounding
the definitional disputes as well as making definitions of what constitutes a
component and what constitutes a sub-component a key area of disagreement.[11]
Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War, the US has renewed development
and testing of anti-ballistic missile systems. These efforts include improvements
in space-borne systems among three services: the Navy's upper tier as well as
airborne and surface-based systems; the Air Force's Laser and Theater Anti-Air
Defense System (THAAD); the Navy's lower tier and the Army's Patriot.
Additional interpretations of the 1967 Treaty apply to the area of anti-satellite
weapons applications as evidenced by the fact that the former Soviet Union
developed an anti-satellite weapons system as early as 1968. This satellite
interceptor program caused little unrest in the US primarily because testing had
ceased in 1971, ostensibly as a result of easing tensions between the two
countries. [12] Technically, anti-satellite weapons can be ground-based; thus, not
space weapons, avoiding treaty disagreements. However, the technologies being
developed today for anti-satellite weaponry can be applied to satellites in an
offensive space control mode. Therefore, anti-satellite weapons may hasten the
space-based deployment of offensive earth-attack weapons through dual usage of
common technologies.
Geopolitical, Military and Diplomatic Factors
Today's military is increasingly dependent on reliable, and secure sets of space
systems. The information revolution has reached into space. Ways to deny,
disrupt, or alter information provided to the enemy is particularly sought after by
the competent battlefield commander. Military policymakers, however, have so
far been reluctant to risk interruption of commercially generated information
flow. The increasing reliance by modern forces on precision-guided weapons
relying on commercial GPS systems has created unusual dependence of a military
on a business.
Considering the current global situation, it is fair game to debate whether US
space based assets are really at risk. Some have foretold of a "Space Pearl Harbor"
but this seems a bit disingenuous. The Soviet Union had a working anti-satellite
weapons system in the early 1970's and given adequate funding, modern Russia
would be capable of building another more up-to date system. Our European
allies could likely build and deploy an ASAT system but have also resisted
spending the money to build one. Other countries with space potential include
Brazil, China, India, and Iran. [13] To date, the perceived threat has not matched
the enthusiasm to commit to the effort.
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The US has no active ASAT program but since 9/11 is more actively pursing the
matter. The system would likely be ground-based initially and deployed sometime
in the early decades of the 21st century. This system could be a precursor to an
offensive weapon that would possess the capability to attack and destroy ground
targets. This continuing activity begs the additional question of whether space
should be weaponized and whether Congress is poised to fund the programs.
Wary of the changes in the former Soviet states and the threat of global terrorism,
it seems that they are willing. Congress realizes that the US military cannot be
caught unprepared again in defense of the Homeland. Consequently, funding for
research and development of technologies easily adapted to space warfare
continues, despite reservations about weapons in space.
The US does not have a monopoly on the use of space but does dominant it. The
number of nations able to realistically challenge the US in space is limited. The
Russian space program is still operates at an advanced level even though
somewhat stagnant due to economic difficulties. China certainly has the potential
to be a major space power in the 21st century. Other countries have launch
facilities and technological prowess to pursue interests in space. How these space
capable countries would react or be capable of significantly reacting to further US
space superiority remains to be seen. Regardless, US strategists need to consider
the possibilities. Should such a threat materialize, the US monopoly in space
warfare would be eliminated, much as the atomic bomb monopoly was lost when
the Soviet Union developed an atomic bomb. At least some analysts believe that
strategy would cover aspects of space control, missile defense and force
application from space.
The financial costs could be prohibitive. Nonetheless, the Air Force alone is
expected to invest $185 million in the areas of surveillance ad prevention during
fiscal year 2003. More specifically, one official was quoted as saying, "Air Force
Space Command is developing a concept of operations for space control and has
launched a "red force" namely the 527th Space Aggressor Squadron to pinpoint
vulnerabilities in US systems.[14] The military is progressing with plans to
militarize and weaponize space on a steady, quiet basis even if not full steam
ahead. Therefore, US policymakers must seriously consider the effect of US
unilateral violation of current international space treaties. The US is the most
powerful nation on earth and clearly capable of space superiority. The real
question is whether or not it is worth it politically, diplomatically and
economically to take such steps.
Space Weapons
By 2025 it is very likely that space will be to the air as air to the cavalry today.
-Air Force 2025: America's Vigilant Edge
In general, technological innovations in air and space will maintain a
revolutionary pace well into the 21st century. The technical pathway of what can
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be accomplished given enough resources and political will versus what should be
accomplished is a process constantly in transition. Technical difficulties that
seemed almost insurmountable a decade ago are being conquered today somewhat
routinely and on a regular basis. Plans to move out into space have been on the
drawing boards for years. Paralleling advancements in the general area of air and
space are developmental plans regarding space based offensive weapons.
Satellite Systems Developments
Two technological impediments to space offensive weapons deployment serve as
the greatest challenge to date. They fall into two categories: space launch
technologies and high power generation systems. Space launch systems are very
expensive and limit the size of the space cargo able to be transported. Lift in the
US is particularly expensive, hence commercial satellite provider's usage of
Baikenour in Kazakhstan and other launch facilities in China. Power requirements
to operate satellites tactically, i.e., to move them from low orbits to high,
necessitate enormous amounts of energy. High power generation systems are
needed to fire and maintain weapons that use high-energy lasers, thereby avoiding
frequent and costly re-fuelling.
Considerable interest has developed in devices to decrease the size of future space
platforms and ease the space lift requirements. These tiny devices, called
microelectromechanical systems (MEMS), numbering many thousand to a
standard computer microchip, will be able to sense heat, light, motion and sound
and can be used in a number of space applications including control of reflective
mirror surfaces in space-based laser systems.[15] In discussing power generation
systems, one cannot overlook the potential use of nuclear power in space,
especially for long-term power requirements. Power beaming technologies,
transmitting power through ground-based lasers to satellites, may be
technologically feasible and would be more politically appealing.[16] They would
also represent a tempting target.
Each weapon system that is developed and deployed will require a complete
"system of systems" architecture approach for the design.[17] Each weapon will
be associated with its interconnected surveillance, acquisition, tracking and battle
damage assessment system for a complete stand-alone capability.[18] These
constellations of satellites will be less susceptible to attack because a single attack
will not disable the entire system.[19] Several of these constellations, in low earth
orbit, can provide global, full-time coverage. Two basic types of weapons systems
are being touted as the most realistically achievable: high-powered lasers and
kinetic weapons.
Lasers
High-powered chemical lasers have been developed and tested for years, initially
for missile defense systems. Over time, these weapons have undergone significant
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improvements in optics, power generation, beam control, miniaturization, and
other key factors.[20] In the next thirty years, a prototype system could be
developed that will allow global engagement of targets in minutes or seconds
anywhere in the world.
Chemical oxygen-iodine lasers (COILs) have been produced that also have
weapons applications. The US Air Force will use this type of laser in the Airborne
Laser (ABL) system. This system, designed for ballistic missile defense, will soon
reach operational capability. The disadvantages of the ABL, the requirement to be
airborne in the area of operations during expected attack by ballistic missile, is
precisely what makes a space-based laser a desirable achievement. A space-based
laser system would provide constant coverage if enough constellations were
deployed.
The power density (fluence) or the energy density (irradiance) achieved on target
as measured in kilojoules per square centimeter or in watts per centimeter
determines the lethality of the weapon. The power radiated by the laser and the
size of the spot on the target affects this density. The smaller the spot size with a
given quantity of energy irradiating the target, the greater the lethality of the
weapon. Against satellite targets, lower amounts of energy would be required due
to the short time of irradiation and the lack of atmospheric interference. Typical
irradiance levels required for surface targets range from 100 to 10,000 watts/cm2;
for satellites, 1 to 10 watts/cm2 is sufficient to achieve target kill.[21]
Effective focusing of the laser's beam is a primary consideration in weapons
design. Because the same amount of energy is contained in the beam, a larger spot
size equates to lesser irradiance and thus less lethality. To improve the beam
focusing, various technologies will have to be developed such as large lightweight
optics, adaptive optics using MEMS, or arrays of solid-state diode lasers.[22] All
of these improvements are currently being funded and researched.
Chemical lasers will likely later be supplanted by solid-state diode pumped lasers
(SSDPLs). Power levels of these new types of lasers have been attained in the
kilowatt range. Advances in production will lower the cost of these lasers and will
lead to megawatt scale high-energy lasers of a compact nature for use in spacebased applications. There are no apparent technical limitations on power level for
these lasers. Current developments indicate the potential of arrays of diode lasers
becoming the weapons of choice for space applications.[23]
Lasers are not, however, all weather systems. Clouds, rain, and atmospheric
effects can scatter the laser's beam and require an increased power output to
compensate. Large optics are also required; the size is dependent upon the
frequency of the laser output and the range to the target. For the frequencies of
laser systems currently under development, a 20-meter diameter optical system
will be required for a satellite in low earth orbit.[24]
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Lasers are extremely flexible weapons in that the amount of lethality can be
controlled by the duration of the pulse and the power of irradiation. Thus, at high
power levels and long duration (several seconds), burn through and target
destruction can be achieved. At lower power levels, electronic degradation,
melting, infrared sensor blinding, and target designations for laser-guided
weapons can be produced. Flammable materials will catch fire under fairly low
irradiation levels making targets such as gasoline refineries tempting.
Several methods provide defense against the efforts of lasers. Covering targets
with a reflective or ablative fire resistant coating will lessen the heat buildup on
surfaces. Protective coatings on missile launch sites, radar and electronic
equipment may forestall laser attacks. Another potential countermeasure takes
advantage of the fact that lasers will not penetrate through layers of earth, making
hardened and buried targets safe.
Moving targets are not safe, especially if the acquisition and targeting systems are
interconnected with the weapon in real time. Lasers can destroy targets in seconds
from activation making even supersonic aircraft vulnerable. Lasing of fuel tanks
or external weapons will explode the aircraft.
High-powered lasers have already proven effective in providing cruise missile
defense and downing ballistic missiles in boost phase. Once high power
generation technology advances are made and miniaturization techniques are
employed easing the space lift burden, space laser weapons should be readily
available for production and deployment.
Kinetic Weapons
Kinetic weapons are missiles or other types of projectiles launched from spacebased platforms and either guided by GPS or laser designator. They destroy the
target by attaining hypersonic speeds and shattering it with an enormous force.
This type of weapon has the projected capability of destroying targets buried
hundreds of feet underground.[25] Again, space based kinetic weapons would
provide yet another tempting target for an adversary.
Kinetic weapons have the potential to be extremely accurate with GPS terminal
guidance, similar to current day precision guided munitions but without
explosives. They have great destructive potential due to the speeds that they
obtain. Single targets or multiple targets can be attacked depending on the type of
projectile employed.[26] Unlike lasers, they will be all-weather weapons, capable
of being launched from satellites and striking targets anywhere on earth in a
matter of minutes.
Kinetic weapons will not require the power generation equipment that highpowered lasers will. This gives them a distinct advantage. Interconnectivity with
surveillance, acquisition, and targeting satellites in a system architecture will, like
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laser, create a potent weapon system. The distributive nature of the constellation
approach to satellite weaponry will allow less susceptibility to anti-satellite
attacks. Other stealthy approaches to manufacture will also aid in defense.
The main problem with kinetic weapons is the fact that they generate lots of heat
upon reentry. This can seriously degrade the electronic GPS receiver for terminal
guidance. The use of a laser beam to lead the projectile through the atmosphere,
creating a bow wave to partially shield it is one potential cure.[27] Defense
against kinetic weapons is nearly impossible once the weapon has been launched.
Anti-satellite weapons to eliminate the satellite before it launches or disruption of
GPS service appear to be the only defensive measures to prevent kinetic attack.
Of course, neither of these have the capability to prevent a preemptive strike
making them rather vulnerable.[28]
The technology to allow kinetic strikes is available today. Thus, in the future,
advancement in technology will allow even greater accuracies and destructive
power. This technology has some very appealing attributes for future space
weaponry.
Strategy and Doctrine
Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not
upon those who wait to adapt themselves after they occur.
-Guilio Douhet
Military commanders are expected to limit the loss of troops and equipment in
modern warfare. Precision guided munitions and stealth technologies provide an
invaluable tool in such an effort. Historically, weapons like the Tomahawk
missile have helped eliminate the need for aviators to attack through enemy air
defenses, reducing exposure to hostile fire and protecting the pilot and jet. By all
estimates, war in the future will be even more technologically oriented with little
direct confrontation.
Commanders, isolated from the danger of the battlefield, will employ unmanned
systems to execute surveillance, target and destroy the enemy. Offensive space
weapons will improve the commander's ability to protect and defend with less
loss. Space weapons will also have a true global reach. This will clearly impact
peacetime military roles and combat planning. US national security strategy needs
to be specific in the appropriate application of such systems should they ever be
deployed. Assuming that the decision to deploy offensive spaced based weapons
is a foregone conclusion, military strategy and doctrine must be adapted
accordingly.
Doctrine in Peacetime
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The primary peacetime manifesto for these weapons will be deterrence. The
potential destructiveness will at first be questionable, but will no doubt give US
adversaries reason to ponder nonetheless. Unfortunately, out of sheer mistrust
they are likely to pursue efforts to combat a perceived threat, whatever allegedly
positive US intentions for use of the weapons might be.
Additionally, since these weapons will be susceptible to anti-satellite technology,
it will be tempting for the US to preemptively strike anti-satellite production
facilities and launch sites of any adversary. The collateral damage from these
weapons may also be so small as to favor these preemptive strikes because
negative international reaction will be at a minimum as long as damage is
contained and personnel casualties are low. This is quite different from the
previous philosophy of avoidance of military action in peacetime unless directly
attacked.[29] Of course, the goal of avoiding preemption has already been
circumvented by military action in Iraq.
Deployment of offensive satellite systems, especially in peacetime, will
automatically generate international reaction. Nations who have rivalries with the
US, whether economic or military, will find it necessary to try to develop
countermeasures and defensive systems. In some cases, countermeasures are
currently on the drawing board but limited because steps areexpensive to design
and build. The US monopoly on the deployment of these weapons would likely be
temporary at best. The primary threat to the US domination of space, anti-satellite
weapons, would have to be frequently monitored and upgrades would constantly
be needed.
Once deployed, the presence of space weapons may not have a great deterrent
effect. To date, the quantity of destructive power is not available to seriously
disable aggressive actions before they start. The mere presence of lethal
equipment has not historically impeded an aggressor's actions and there's no
reason to believe an unseen weapon in space would have any effect, particular one
without major potential for total devastation.
Doctrine in War
Wartime use of space weapons will be multi-faceted and immediate. As part of a
strategic campaign against an enemy nation, space weapons will be able to attack
anywhere within seconds. This will make nearly any military or civilian target
that has not previously been protected subject to destruction. Specific targets
might include intelligence headquarters, electric power grids, communication
nodes, leadership, command bunkers, dams, roads, bridges, buried ammunition
bunkers, and energy facilities, but anything would be vulnerable. The pinpoint
precision and impact within seconds sends a strong psychological signal to an
enemy.[30] Consequently, with such destructive ability comes the responsibility
to act and plan conscientiously.
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Tactical targets can be attacked directly from space. Due to the quick reaction and
speed of laser weapons, tanks, aircraft, armored vehicles, missiles, helicopters,
and ships, nearly any surface-based military target can be engaged and destroyed.
Ships at sea will no longer be immune from attack in any part of the ocean.
Eventually, nations will need to control space in order to control the sea, air or the
land.
Such envious capability will be why space will become the main battleground
once US space monopoly ends. The battle for control of space will be the total
war. Anti-satellite weapons will be used extensively to eliminate the earth attack
satellite systems. Anti-satellite weapons would have to be developed and
deployed to counter the enemy space control weapons. The never-ending cycle
will drive a continuous arms race in space.
Joint Pub 3-14, Joint Space Doctrine, assigns force application and space control
as primary space missions. Force application will include attacking airborne and
terrestrial targets and possibly missile defense. These will be the primary missions
of a future "Airspace Force." At a conference in Huntsville Alabama in 2002, J-5
Vice Director of US Space Command admitted that the command is directly
responsible for this type of mission. The type of global reach described has not
been seen before. Although, stealthy B-2 bombers can apply precise force
anywhere in the world, the time to get there is not comparable to the speed of
delivery from space.
Stealth is never absolute. Conventional Tomahawk and air-launched cruise
missiles will become obsolete. Space control will be a second primary mission,
defined as the ability to assure freedom of action in space and deny the same to
the enemy. This translates into an ability to defend US space assets from space.
US policymakers have put the task in the hands of the US Space Command.
However, the US Army has addressed the issue as well. They are concerned that
such space based capabilities will negate the current advantage they possess by
the use of satellite imagery, communications and precision targeting.
The New Strategy
To assess the impact of offensive space weapons on military strategy in the 21st
Century, one must look at history. After World War I, many in the fledgling US
Army Air Service and elsewhere throughout the world were expounding the
theory of air power. Strategic bombing of cities was presumed to eliminate the
enemy's will to fight bringing all future conflicts to a rapid conclusion. Guilio
Douhet proclaimed that the side who had control of the air would win the next
war. Billy Mitchell proved how air power would master the air above the sea as
well as land by sinking the German battleship Ostfriesland from the air in
1921.[31] The obvious conclusion was that land and sea forces were no longer
needed. Air power had arrived. But like many new innovations, its promise was
well beyond its ability to deliver.
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Another revolutionary weapon introduced at the end of World War II, the atomic
bomb, demonstrated the dominant role air power would play. Many now believe
these weapons showed, as Mitchell had predicted, that air power would eliminate
the need for conventional military forces. Nuclear attack would decide all future
wars. The fear of nuclear annihilation kept the two superpowers from engaging in
a conventional military confrontation and "mutually assured destruction." Real
deterrence had arrived.
The argument for a space force that will reduce or eliminate the need for other
surface or air forces generates similar claims. Space-based weapons, responding
in seconds, penetrating anywhere on earth, always available, flexible and lethal,
can become the new weapon of choice to control and end conflict and prevent
through the fear of attack any aggression on the part of our enemies. On the other
end, they can kill us all; especially if nuclear.
In reality, nuclear weapons have not eliminated the need for a robust conventional
weapons capability to include navies and armies; and it is likely space-based
offensive weapons will not either. Generally, dream usage of new weapon
systems do not often materialize as expected. Ultimately, war is reduced, and
some would argue always reduced, to man versus man, the essence of human
confrontation.
History has shown also that the ability to attack from more than one direction or
dimension using more than one weapons system has been a valuable force
multiplier. Although space weapons may be a formidable asset to the Joint Force
Commander, a commander will still rely more conventional "tools in the regular
toolbox" weapons systems.
Currently, space weapons do not have the destructive power of nuclear weapons
unless they themselves are nuclear. Such deployment of nuclear weapons in space
is particularly confrontational and should definitely not be pursued unless some
truly remarkable circumstances somehow arise. Therefore, space weapons
become just another conventional precision attack weapon. They will continue to
be an augmentation to other weapons, not a replacement. Nuclear military
strategy is unlikely to be affected.
Although space weapons may have a role in future conflict at sea, peacetime
presence and crisis response missions, including Marine Corps contingency
operations are not likely to disappear. The Navy will have a viable and significant
role to play in this arena. Aircraft carriers, as the showpiece of American
diplomacy and the center of crisis response operations, will still be a viable and
reliable tool; but strategists will need to consider defending them appropriately.
Simply put, there will be nowhere to hide.
Ground combat operations will be needed for the same reasons they are utilized
today - permanent conflict termination. Without ground forces present inside the
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enemy nation, the end of war may not be affected on the term desired by the US
political leadership regardless of how difficult it often is to win the peace. Army
forces will remain the final tool in US power diplomacy. The Air Force may have
expanded roles in the control of space but will, politics aside, not delete any of its
current airborne missions and rely solely on space-based offensive weapons.
Close air support and air reinforcement operations will serve the same functions
they have in the past and the long range bombing option will still provide an
alternative choice.
Space control warfare, with anti-satellite missions in prominence, will impact
future strategy and planning. Information technology and the data received and
heavily relied upon by field commanders, provided today to the commander from
satellites, may be interrupted. Back-up systems will have to be developed,
possibly using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) able to provide real-time
surveillance, intelligence, and targeting information in lieu of satellites or the old
fashioned way.
Revolutionary changes in the conduct of war in the next century cannot solely be
predicted based on the presence of space offensive weapons. As a force
multiplier, they can be a significant asset to a commander due to their quick
reaction, measured lethality, and global availability. Kinetic weapons will have an
added capability to destroy deeply buried command or ammunition bunkers.
Regardless, as a significant factor in influencing the outcome of a conflict and in
totally eliminating the need for other more conventional weapons, they will not
alter the status quo, just enhance it.
Anti-satellite weapons will have a significant place in future military planning.
Using the same kinds of technologies described, whether space-based or groundbased, the US space control mission will eventually be expanded. The US
historically has resisted up until the current Administration, placing any antisatellite weapons systems in operation. The expectation is still that this system
will remain ground-based. However, a space-based system could easily be
developed as the logical follow-on to the ground-based one.
Another likely scenario to begin space weaponization would be the first spacebased anti-ballistic missile defensive system, consisting of some type of laser.
This system would be the obvious follow-on to the Airborne Laser program.
Because President Reagan gave the impetus to ballistic missile defense in the
1980's, before the fall of the Communist governments in the former Soviet Union,
and because of the evil publicity engendered by Saddam Hussein's use of Scud
missiles during Desert Storm, the public support for such a program will likely be
fairly positive.
Both of these weapons system development programs are likely scenarios for the
beginning of the militarization of space, which could open the door for further
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offensive weapons development and deployment. The future of space, beyond the
information age, is likely to be warfare.
Conclusion
A new set of rules for the conduct of war will have to be devised and a whole new
set of ideas of strategy learned by those charged with the conduct of war.
-Brig. General Billy Mitchell, USA (1925)
The US could be the first nation to break the international self-imposed
moratorium on placing offensive weapons in space. The American public's sense
of fair play that the US always abides by the rules in international conduct will
suffer a setback, although no treaties would be broken. But it is likely that the US
public will support defensive weaponry, such as anti-satellite systems, especially
since 9/11. Unilateral arming of space will cause a credibility problem with US
allies around the world. However, the current administration hasn't seemed too
concerned in this regard.
The US cannot afford the exorbitant financial expenditure of space weaponization
at this time. The US must do all it can to avoid a space war. The optimum way to
do this will be to ban anti-satellite weapons. However, this will not by itself
eliminate the threat from space. Space-based anti-ballistic missile systems are
likely to also be produced which can easily be transformed into ground attack
systems.
The US must consider and define the gains, if any, from the unilateral deployment
of offensive space weapons. Less costly and equally effective systems for antiballistic missile defense exist or can be developed that are ground-based or
airborne. The commercial use of space is extensive; especially in the domain of
communications. Opening space up to potential conflict would devastate
American industrial and commercial activities. Simply put, denying the West
access to commercial communications satellites would bring all our economies to
their knees in very short order.
The questions to be answered by US policymakers and military planners can be
consolidated into three significant issues. First, will the US be able to afford these
systems and are they worth the investment? Secondly, will US arrogance expect
other nations to refrain from matching US efforts in space once the US breaks the
moratorium? Thirdly, will offensive space weapons threaten the stability of the
world?
These questions have no simple answers. Many would argue that it is time to ban
all weapons in space. They compare this decision to the one made in abandoning
pursuit of a neutron bomb. However, the pursuit of technological advancement
will continue and the military has the responsibility to continue to develop better
weaponry in order to stay ahead of potential competitors. Conflict between
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competing nations is not likely to end soon and has existed since time
immemorial. Finding a more effective way to prepare and to win the next war is
an obligation not a theory. The US must lead and, as the scouts say, be prepared.
There is no question that protection of space assets, including but not limited to
communications satellites, constitutes a major national security strategic asset for
every nation.
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